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Anxiety disorders constitute a sizeable worldwide health burden with profound social
and economic consequences. The symptoms are wide-ranging; from hyperarousal to
difficulties with concentrating. This latter effect falls under the broad category of altered
cognitive performance which is the focus of this review. Specifically, we examine
the interaction between anxiety and cognition focusing on the translational threat of
unpredictable shock paradigm; a method previously used to characterize emotional
responses and defensive mechanisms that is now emerging as valuable tool for examining
the interaction between anxiety and cognition. In particular, we compare the impact of
threat of shock on cognition in humans to that of pathological anxiety disorders. We
highlight that both threat of shock and anxiety disorders promote mechanisms associated
with harm avoidance across multiple levels of cognition (from perception to attention to
learning and executive function)—a “hot” cognitive function which can be both adaptive
and maladaptive depending upon the circumstances. This mechanism comes at a cost to
other functions such as working memory, but leaves some functions, such as planning,
unperturbed. We also highlight a number of cognitive effects that differ across anxiety
disorders and threat of shock. These discrepant effects are largely seen in “cold” cognitive
functions involving control mechanisms and may reveal boundaries between adaptive
(e.g., response to threat) and maladaptive (e.g., pathological) anxiety. We conclude by
raising a number of unresolved questions regarding the role of anxiety in cognition that
may provide fruitful avenues for future research.
Keywords: anxiety, cognition, threat of shock, anxiety disorders, perception, attention, learning and memory,
executive function
INTRODUCTION
Anxiety disorders are a major worldwide health problem with
sizeable psychological, social, and economic costs (Beddington
et al., 2008). The impact of anxiety on cognitive function is a
major contributing factor to these costs; anxiety disorders can
promote a crippling focus upon negative life-events and make
concentration difficult, which can lead to problems in both social
and work environments. In such situations the state of anxiety
can be seen as maladaptive. Anxiety can, however, also improve
the ability to detect and avoid danger which, under the right
circumstances—such as walking home alone in the dark—can be
adaptive. The precise impact of anxiety on cognition is, however,
unclear. In this narrative review we focus on an emerging, trans-
lational, within-subjects state anxiety induction method—threat
of unpredictable electrical shock—which may help quantify the
impact of anxiety on cognition.
DEFINING COGNITION AND ANXIETY
COGNITION
We define cognition as “information processing” (the term comes
from the Latin cognoscere, which means “to conceptualize,” “to
know,” or “to recognize”). Processing information from the out-
side world and determining how to use that information increases
adaptive strength and reproductive success. In this review, we
make broad a distinction between hot cognition, which involves
affective (i.e., emotionally valenced) information, and cold cog-
nition, which involves affectively neutral information. These cat-
egories are likely too simplistic, but they have heuristic value as
a broad framework in which to dissociate effects. Across both of
these cognitive categories, we also make a distinction between (1)
sensory-perceptual processes (i.e., early processing and detection of
stimuli); (2) attention/control (i.e., the ability to attend to some
stimuli and ignore others); (3) memory (i.e., maintenance and
retrieval of information); and (4) executive function (i.e., com-
plex integrative and decision-making processes). These functions
are presented in order of, broadly speaking, ascending phyloge-
netic “complexity”; perceptual processes occur rapidly, largely in
subcortical and posterior cortical circuits, and attention, higher-
order learning and executive processes require progressively more
complex integration of cortically processed information. There
are, of course, many exceptions, but these four broad divisions
form the logical hierarchical structure for this review.
ANXIETY
Throughout this paper, we examine the effects of anxiety on
the above cognitive functions. To this end, anxiety is defined
as the response to prolonged, unpredictable threat, a response
which encompasses physiological, affective, and cognitive changes
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(Grillon et al., 1991; Grillon, 2008; Davis et al., 2010). According
to this definition, anxiety is distinct from fear; a response to
acute predictable threats. Fear and anxiety are dissociable at the
behavioral, neural, and pharmacological level (Grillon et al., 1991;
Grillon, 2008; Davis et al., 2010). Anxiety states appear to be
well-conserved across numerous species, and as such (similarly to
fear), they confer adaptive value. Specifically, in unfamiliar and
uncertain environments, cautious avoidance while maintaining
heightened vigilance and action readiness for signs of immi-
nent danger improves survival odds (Kalin and Shelton, 1989).
However, if this behavior is adopted permanently it can become
maladaptive.
In this review, we focus on functional responses evoked
in healthy volunteers using the translational threat of shock
paradigm, an experimental model of anxiety which operational-
izes anxiety in the same manner as our definition above—as
responses to prolonged unpredictable threats. These threats are
non-contingent upon the task and are rare and uncontrollable.
Why do we need humanmodels of anxiety? By examining anx-
iety under carefully controlled conditions, we can clarify cause-
effect relations and bridge the gap between the human and animal
literatures on anxiety. Although human models have important
limitations (e.g., no knockout models or single cell recording),
they also present the key advantage of taking into account cer-
tain features of behavior and higher-order cognition that cannot
be modeled in animals (e.g., subjective, conscious experiences,
or language). Human models of anxiety, such as threat of shock,
do not model a pathological state but an adaptive response. As
such, they provide research tools to study functional responses,
which are a prerequisite to identifying dysfunctional mechanisms.
Despite the ubiquity of anxiety, and the global burden of mal-
adaptive anxiety (Beddington et al., 2008), our understanding of
the neural, systems, and psychological mechanisms underlying
anxiety-cognition interactions is surprisingly lacking.
The objectives of this review are thus two-fold, (1) to describe
the effect of induced-anxiety on various cognitive processes and
(2) to identify commonalities and differences with these cog-
nitive processes in pathological anxiety and, where possible, in
high dispositionally (i.e., trait) anxious individuals (see Table 1
for a thorough definition of these different types of anxiety). The
guiding principle of this review is that on the one hand, where
commonalities exist, the threat of shock paradigm can be used as
an analog of pathological anxiety. On the other hand, when dif-
ferences are identified, they may point to important boundaries
between adaptive and maladaptive states.
SENSORY-PERCEPTUAL PROCESSING
Sensory-perceptual processing is the most basic level, and the
foundation of all other cognitive processing. In this context, we
define sensory-perceptual processes as the early (i.e., the most
temporally immediate) processing and detection of environmen-
tal stimuli (e.g., auditory tones or discrete visual cues). We exam-
ine tasks assessing (1) early sensory processing and (2) gating
of early sensory processing. These tasks largely utilize affectively
neutral stimuli and hence fall into the broad category of “cold”
cognitive functions. Following this, we also examine (3) emo-
tional perception which falls under the category of hot cognitive
processing. The effect of both anxiety disorders and threat of
shock on such processes may illuminate, in particular, a profile of
the adaptive effects of anxiety. Specifically, threat of shock studies
point to enhanced sensory-perceptual processing across multiple
stimulus modalities as a function of anxiety. There seems, more-
over, to be a hierarchy of influence with threat of shock having
increasing influence on stimuli that may more likely announce
a potential threat (Table 2). These findings point to a funda-
mental shift whereby sensory-perceptual systems are dynamically
reconfigured during anxiety states to be more sensitive to sen-
sory perturbations. Early threat detection is adaptive because it
facilitates preparation for potential danger, but it can bemaladap-
tive when innocuous stimuli are coded as threatening and when
goal-directed behavior is consistently disrupted.
COLD COGNITION
Early sensory-perceptual effects
In general, anxiety sensitizes sensory cortical systems to innocu-
ous environmental stimuli. Supporting evidence for this claim
comes predominantly from abnormalities in the mismatch neg-
ativity (MMN)-evoked response in clinically anxious and vulner-
able populations. The MMN (and magnetic MMN) is elicited
by passive oddball procedures in which relatively rare stim-
uli are embedded in an otherwise uniform sequence of stim-
uli (e.g., deviation in auditory tone frequency). This evoked
response component, which occurs between 150 and 250ms in
the post-stimulus period, is thought to reflect preattentive change
detection. Auditory MMN amplitudes have been shown to be
abnormally increased in two independent samples of unmed-
icated patients with PTSD (Morgan III and Grillon, 1999; Ge
et al., 2011) and dispositional anxiety has also been shown to
positively correlate with MMN amplitudes (Hansenne et al.,
2003). Consistent with these findings, an investigation of threat-
induced anxiety in healthy individuals found amplified cortical
responding to auditory stimulus deviance (Cornwell et al., 2007),
confirming that these preattentive effects are state-related.
The evidence also suggests that anxiety-enhanced sensory-
perceptual processing precedes cortical involvement. Notably,
ERP studies have shown that brainstem (wave V) responses to
simple auditory stimulation are increased in patients with panic
disorder (Knott et al., 1994) and children with high dispositional
anxiety (Woodward et al., 2001). These findings suggest that anx-
iety boosts auditory signaling very early (∼10ms) in the afferent
pathway at the relatively primitive level of the inferior colliculus.
Using threat of shock, Baas et al. (2006) demonstrated the same
result of increased wave V amplitudes in healthy subjects, extend-
ing key findings from the animal literature (Maisonnette et al.,
1996) to humans.
These studies of auditory processing thus illustrate a close cor-
respondence between findings of increased sensory-perceptual
responding in patient and vulnerable populations and the effects
of threat of shock in healthy subjects. There are two counterex-
amples to note, however. Menning et al. (2008) reported reduced
MMN responses in a small PTSD sample, but medication sta-
tus was not reported; thus, the significance of this potential
exception cannot be properly evaluated. From the developmen-
tal literature, Reeb-Sutherland et al. (2009) reported no MMN
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Table 1 | Definitions of anxiety.
(A) ANXIETY DISORDERS:
(1) Pathological anxiety
Pathological anxiety is associated with persistent and debilitating apprehension about negative future events, and it can have a wide range of effects on
cognitive performance, including facilitative effects (e.g., threat detection) as well as detrimental effects (e.g., distractibility). Indeed, the DSM-IV
definitions of anxiety disorders prominently feature “difficulty concentrating” as a key symptom. DSM-IV defines a number of different anxiety disorders
including generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), phobias, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and obsessive–compulsive disorder [OCD;
although this disorder is now thought to be more of a compulsivity disorder than an anxiety disorder (Fineberg et al., 2009)]. It should be noted that it is
rare to find a patient who suffers a “pure” anxiety disorder because the rates of co-occurrence with depression are very high (Mineka et al., 1998;
Kessler et al., 2012) and it is unclear how many of these symptoms can be attributed to anxiety alone.
(B) ANXIOUS STATES:
(2) The threat of shock paradigm
The threat of shock technique is a robust, translational (Davis et al., 2010), and well-validated (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012) within-subjects anxiety
induction technique in which subjects are told that they are at risk of infrequent electrical shocks. Whilst anticipating the shocks subjects can be tested
upon a cognitive task. This can alternate with a “safe” no shock condition to directly manipulate state anxiety within subjects. Such designs have a
number of advantages; each subject acts as his or her own control; the psychological state of interest (i.e., anxiety) is directly manipulated; and the
heterogeneities (e.g., comorbidities) of patient populations are avoided (Robinson et al., 2012b).
(3) Self-report questionnaire measures
Another popular approach to examining the impact of anxiety on cognition is through the use of non-diagnostic questionnaires to determine a
disposition to anxiety [e.g., Spielberger trait anxiety scale (Spielberger et al., 1970)] or the BIS/BAS (“behavioral approach system behavioral avoidance
inhibition system”; Carver and White, 1994) that seek to capture stable attributes of anxiety, including specific triggers (e.g., public speaking,
mathematical problem solving, test-taking). Dispositional/trait anxiety scores are then correlated with task outcomes or, alternatively, a median split
approach compares high and low anxious subjects. Dispositional anxiety is often viewed as a vulnerability factor in the development of psychopathology
but there are multiple differences when comparing across induced and dispositional anxiety. It should be noted that neither pathological nor
dispositional anxiety can be turned on and off (e.g., for memory tasks, effects on encoding, and retrieval cannot be studied separately) or studied in
isolation. It is therefore important to note that their associated effects cannot be irrefutably attributed to anxiety versus another related aspect of the
disorder [e.g., personality factors, cognitive diathesis (Abramson et al., 2002)]. Moreover, there are a number of statistical concerns regarding self-report
approaches (Shackman et al., 2006). For example; correlational analyses are not directional, median split analyses, or other extreme-groups (categorical;
e.g., upper/lower tercile or decile) approaches can result in arbitrary cut-offs. In the present text we refer to studies utilizing this methodology
specifically as dispositional anxiety studies; in contrast with the induced-anxiety evoked by threat of shock.
(4) Other state anxiety paradigms
In addition to threat of shock, there are number of other common stress/anxiety inductions including social (speech) stressors, cold pressor tests
(where the hand is submerged in cold water), and viewing anxiety-inducing movies or pictures. Although this review does not focus on these
techniques, they are occasionally referenced where they illuminate differences or can help interpret results under threat of shock. One key problem with
some of these manipulations (such as anxiety-inducing movies) is that they are often between-session manipulations performed once at the start of a
study visit, with testing following manipulation. As such, it can be unclear whether they reveal the effects of anxiety or the recovery from a stressor
(Shackman et al., 2006).
Table 2 | Effects of anxiety on sensory-perceptual processing (arrows represent direction of effect).
Domain Task details Threat of shock Anxiety disorders
References References
Early sensory Presentation of sounds/pictures ↑ Baas et al., 2006; Cornwell et al., 2007;
Laretzaki et al., 2010; Shackman et al.,
2011a
↑ Knott et al., 1994; Morgan III and
Grillon, 1999; Woodward et al., 2001;
Ge et al., 2011
Sensory gating Ocular motor response to sound ↑ Davis, 1998; Grillon, 2002# ↑ Grillon, 2002#
Sensory gating Startle attenuated by cue (PPI) ↑ Grillon and Davis, 2007; Cornwell et al.,
2008
= Grillon et al., 1996; Ludewig et al.,
2002; Hoenig et al., 2005
Emotion perception Detection of negative information ↑ Grillon and Charney, 2011; Robinson
et al., 2011, 2012a
↑ Monk et al., 2006; Blair et al., 2008;
Roy et al., 2008
#, =: review paper.
differences between two adolescent groups that differed in dis-
positional anxiety. Surprisingly, each group contained a similar
proportion of individuals with current anxiety, which seems to
be the more relevant factor in modulating sensory-perceptual
systems and thus potentially explains the lack of a difference
in MMN response. Moreover, although there is no comparable
work in patient populations, evidence from the visual system also
indicates that early sensory processing of neutral stimuli (within
100ms) is augmented under threat of shock, both in terms of
higher-evoked response amplitudes (Shackman et al., 2011a) and
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faster latencies (Laretzaki et al., 2010). Altogether, anxiety states
appear to fundamentally alter central sensory pathways and pro-
foundly shape bottom-up signaling to enhance the detection of
even slight changes in the environment.
Sensory gating effects
Sensory gating refers to filtering mechanisms that constrain affer-
ent signaling to allow for elaborative processing of certain stimuli.
The evidence from sensory gating is mixed, but may highlight the
distinction between acute and chronic effects of anxiety. Increased
sensory-perceptual sensitization under anxiety may lower detec-
tion thresholds for threat stimuli, but could also overload sensory
systems. One key example of sensory gating is prepulse inhibi-
tion (PPI) of the startle reflex (Grillon et al., 1991). In addition
to the phylogenetically-preserved potentiation of startle responses
during fear and anxiety states (Davis, 1998; Grillon, 2002), it
is well-established that startle responses are diminished when
a weak, non-startling stimulus (prepulse) precedes the startling
stimulus by a short interval (e.g., 120ms; Blumenthal et al.,
1999). Although most clinical work has focused on schizophrenia
(Braff et al., 2001), potential PPI abnormalities have been stud-
ied in clinically anxious and vulnerable populations. Reduced PPI
has been documented in panic disorder (Ludewig et al., 2002),
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Hoenig et al., 2005) and PTSD
(Grillon et al., 1996). These patients show little or no diminu-
tion of startle reactivity when the startling stimulus is preceded
shortly by a weak prepulse. Evidence from measures of disposi-
tional anxiety is less clear, with some providing additional data
of reduced PPI in high anxiety and other vulnerable populations
(Corr et al., 2002; Duley et al., 2007; Franklin et al., 2009), and
others reporting null results (Grillon et al., 1997; Lipschitz et al.,
2005; De Pascalis et al., 2013).
Two studies investigated how PPI might be modulated dur-
ing sustained threat of shock (Grillon and Davis, 2007; Cornwell
et al., 2008). In stark contrast to the findings above, they reported
enhanced PPI using various prepulse stimuli (acoustic and tactile)
under threat-induced anxiety. These divergent results—that anx-
iety patients exhibit impaired sensory gating (decreased PPI) and
healthy subjects show enhanced sensory gating (increased PPI) in
a threat-induced anxiety state—deserve an explanation. We can
speculate that while anxiety induced by threat of shock closely
models the immediate effects of negative arousal and anticipation,
it does not capture the long-term (chronic) effects of stress and
worry. Threat-induced anxiety states increase PPI via facilitation
of sensory-perceptual processing of weak stimuli. Sensory gating
mechanisms may, however, deteriorate with persistent increased




While threat-induced anxiety can boost sensory-perceptual pro-
cessing in general, it also selectively improves the processing of
extrinsically and intrinsically salient stimuli. The discussion thus
far has focused on studies employing simple, innocuous stimuli to
study early sensory-perceptual effects. But even there we find evi-
dence that the relative significance of some stimuli is preserved in
terms of modulating sensory-perceptual responses. For instance,
an infrequent oddball stimulus boosts auditory cortical process-
ing relative to the repetitive, standard stimulus (Cornwell et al.,
2007). In this case, the relative significance of the auditory stim-
uli is extrinsically driven by the probability of their occurrence,
as though rare (i.e., unexpected) changes in the environment
are especially salient in an anticipatory anxiety state (perhaps
in terms of predicting imminent danger). A similar effect of
threat-induced anxiety has been observed when stimuli are made
relevant by task instructions (Eason et al., 1969).
More conclusive evidence that anxiety enhances sensory-
perceptual processing comes from studies that include
intrinsically salient stimuli. Facial displays of emotion have
been heavily-used in this regard (see e.g., Haxby et al., 2000;
Phillips et al., 2003). Clinical populations show comparable biases
toward aversive relative to appetitive face across behavioral and
neural dimensions (Monk et al., 2006; Blair et al., 2008; Roy et al.,
2008), as do individuals with increased dispositional anxiety
(Cools et al., 2005; Telzer et al., 2008). However, few studies have
used threat of shock to determine how state anxiety may alter
facial emotion processing. Behavioral measures have been used
to show that compared to facial expressions of happiness, fearful
expressions are correctly identified more rapidly during threat
than safe conditions (Robinson et al., 2011). A follow-up fMRI
study replicated this behavioral finding and provided evidence
of potential neural correlates of this effect including increased
prefrontal-amygdala coupling (Robinson et al., 2012a). Similarly,
research has shown that while static facial displays of fear do
not alone increase startle reactivity relative to neutral emotional
displays, they do so if they are presented during periods of threat
of shock (Grillon and Charney, 2011). These results suggest that
threat-induced anxiety can boost sensory-perceptual processing
of affectively-congruent stimuli, such as fearful faces that convey
the more relevant signal while anticipating shock, but the
methodology (e.g., sluggish fMRI response, delayed startle onset)
leaves open (in contrast to the above early sensory processing
findings) the possibility that other downstream cognitive pro-
cesses are influencing these biases (Pessoa, 2005). Finally, a recent
study examined the impact of modulating expectancy of fearful
and happy faces by pairing them with neutral cues. This task
revealed that threat of shock increased responses to unexpected
fear (but not happy) faces (i.e., prediction errors) in the striatum
(Robinson et al., 2013b) indicating a bias toward detecting novel
threats under anxiety. In some respects this can be seen as adding
an affective component to the MMN stimulus deviation effect
outlined above (Cornwell et al., 2007).
As a contrast to studies demonstrating enhanced processing of
aversive stimuli one study (Bublatzky et al., 2010) presented neg-
ative, positive, and emotionally-neutral pictorial stimuli under
threat and safe conditions, but found that only the positive
pictures elicited differential electrophysiological activity across
contexts. In general, however, a bias toward processing negative
emotional information seems to be relatively consistent across
threat of shock, anxiety disorders, and dispositional anxiety.
ATTENTION/CONTROL
Anxious patients suffer from debilitating intrusive thoughts and
feelings as well as dysregulated attention mechanisms [e.g.,
distractibility, impaired concentration (Eysenck et al., 2007)].
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These symptoms have been linked to attentional bias for threat.
Individuals with anxiety disorders or dispositional anxiety show a
proclivity to detect and process threat-related information, which
interferes with performance in various attentional tasks (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007). However, it has become increasingly apparent
that some of these deficits may be secondary to or occur in the
context of a poor ability to use attentional resources (cognitive
control) to flexibly adjust attention in the face of changing envi-
ronment (Derryberry and Reed, 2002; Eysenck et al., 2007). Thus,
attention problems in anxiety are complex andmay result from an
imbalance between bottom-up stimulus-driven processing (see
previous section) and top-down attention control. This section
is concerned with the literature on anxiety effects on attention
control and attentional bias that may contribute to attention
problems and distractibility. The first section focuses on non-
emotional conflict, a “cold” cognitive function, while the last
section deals with two “hot” cognitive functions, attentional bias
and emotional interference.
While there is increased consensus indicating that “anxiety”
promotes attentional bias for threat and has a detrimental effect
on control processes, a closer look at the data reveal a more
complex picture. There is convergent evidence for attentional
bias in anxiety disorders, dispositional anxiety, and state anxi-
ety. However, there is no similar convergent evidence of anxiety’s
negative effect on control processes. In general, deficits in atten-
tional control have been reported in clinical and dispositional
anxiety, but not for anxiety induced by threat of shock. If any-
thing, induced-anxiety is associated with better attention control
(Hu et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 2012b), possibly because of




Increased distractibility, attentional lapses, inability to main-
tain attention, poor concentration, and intrusive thoughts could
be secondary to amygdala-based hyper-active threat detection
mechanism (Mathews and Mackintosh, 1998). However, these
maladaptive behaviors also occur in the absence of external threat,
raising the possibility that anxiety is associated with a general
impairment in attention control (Bishop, 2009; Shin et al., 2011;
Stout et al., 2013). Perhaps the most prominent model to explain
deficit in cognitive performance in anxious individuals is the dual
competition framework that describes the interaction between
cognition and emotion (Pessoa, 2009). The model proposes that
task-irrelevant threat information competes for central process-
ing resources with cognition, potentially impairing cognitive pro-
cesses (Pessoa, 2009). An extension of this model is that tasks that
require attentional resources because of conflict or interference
will be more affected than tasks with little conflict or interfer-
ence or tasks that rely on automatic and habitual responses, which
are not affected (or potentially facilitated) (Spence and Spence,
1966). An alternative is that anxiety improves the selectivity of
attention because it restricts attention to peripheral cues, facilitat-
ing tasks with restricted number of cues compared to multi-cues
tasks (e.g., Easterbrook, 1959). Lastly, poor attentional control
could also result from sensitized perceptual processing (see above
Sensory-perceptual processing). Indeed, threat of shock has dis-
sociable effects on information processing, facilitating early per-
ceptual processes but impairing subsequent evaluative processing
(Shackman et al., 2011a,b).
So far the literature points to diverging interference effects in
clinical and dispositional anxiety compared to threat of shock-
induced anxiety. Clinical and dispositional levels of anxiety are
both associated with enhanced interference, a finding that is con-
sistent with the dual competition framework. In contrast, the
relatively scarce studies using threat of shock tend to find reduced
interference, suggesting that elevated anxiety states improve the
selectivity of anxiety, as suggested by Easterbrook (1959). Most
of the claims of poor attentional control are based on stud-
ies with individuals scoring high on measures of dispositional
anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007; Hajcak and Foti, 2008; Bishop,
2009), rather than patients with a clinical disorder. In addi-
tion, while deficits in cognitive control brain areas have been
documented in clinically and dispositionally anxious popula-
tions, these deficits do not always translate into performance
Table 3 | Effects of anxiety on attentional bias and attention control tasks (arrows represent direction of effect).
Domain Task details Threat of shock Anxiety disorders
References References
Attention bias Emotional Stroop bias toward threat ↑ Edwards et al., 2006, 2010 ↑ Bar-Haim et al., 2007#
Attention bias Dot-probe bias toward threat ↓ Shechner et al., 2012 ↑ Bar-Haim et al., 2007#
Emotional interference Emotional interference task ↑ Cornwell et al., 2011 N/A
Emotional conflict Emotion conflict task = Robinson et al., 2011 ↑ Etkin et al., 2010; Etkin and Schatzberg,
2012
Conflict adaptation Emotion conflict task = Robinson et al., 2011 ↓ Etkin et al., 2010; Etkin and Schatzberg,
2012
Non-emotional control Interference on Classic Stroop = Tecce and Happ, 1964 ↑ Litz et al., 1996; Lagarde et al., 2010
↓ Agnew and Agnew, 1963; Tecce
and Happ, 1964; Hu et al., 2012
↓ Choi et al., 2012
#, =: review paper.
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deficits, perhaps because anxious individuals recruit additional
processing resources (Eysenck et al., 2007). Indeed, several studies
have examined the performance of anxious patients in the
classic color-naming Stroop (Stroop, 1935) with mixed behav-
ioral results as both normal and impaired performance have
been reported (Litz et al., 1996; Lagarde et al., 2010; Thomaes
et al., 2012). Similar results have been obtained with other mea-
sures of cognitive control. For example, obsessive compulsive
disorder and generalized anxiety disorders are associated with
abnormal neural signs of control monitoring, as reflected in
enhanced error detection mechanisms (i.e., error-related negativ-
ity; Vaidyanathan et al., 2012), without concomitant performance
impairment (Stern et al., 2010; Weinberg et al., 2012).
Several studies have examined the effect of threat of shock
on Stroop [or Stroop-like tasks (Choi et al., 2012), Go/NoGo
(Robinson et al., 2013a), and anti-saccade tasks (Cornwell
et al., 2012b)]. While all these experiments, especially Go/NoGo
and anti-saccade, require some degree of control of pre-
potent responses, only Stroop examines interferences from task-
irrelevant stimuli. Stroop findings are somewhat inconsistent
with studies showing no specific influence of threat of shock on
Stroop effect (Tecce and Happ, 1964) as well as impaired (Pallak
et al., 1975; Choi et al., 2012) or improved (Hu et al., 2012)
performance. This inconsistency could be attributed to procedu-
ral differences, especially among older non-computerized studies
(Pallak et al., 1975; Choi et al., 2012). Recently, Choi et al. (2012)
used a Stroop-like “response-conflict” task in which subjects had
to identify whether a picture was a house or a building while
ignoring task-irrelevant congruent and incongruent words (i.e.,
house, bldng) printed in the middle of the pictures. Shock antic-
ipation impaired performance on the incongruent trials (Choi
et al., 2012), which the authors interpreted in the context of the
dual competition framework (Pessoa, 2009), i.e., shock threat
monitoring competes for central resources adversely impacting
conflict processing (Choi et al., 2012). However, these results were
not confirmed in another study by the same group. In fact, Hu
et al. (2012) found that shock threat improved performance on
the classic Stroop. Because improved performance was accompa-
nied by a general increase in reaction time to the congruent and
control trials, it was suggested that the better ability to resolve the
conflict was caused by the adoption of a more cautious approach,
trading slower speed for better performance accuracy (Agnew and
Agnew, 1963; Tecce and Happ, 1964; Hu et al., 2012). It seems
that adopting cautious behavior would be adaptive when anxious
because it would prevent any potential impulsive response that
could have devastating consequence. However, it is unlikely that
shock-induced anxiety generally leads to what could be consid-
ered a cautious pro-active behavior set (Braver, 2012).Most threat
of shock studies do not report a slowdown of reaction time across
a wide variety of tasks (Shackman et al., 2006; Cornwell et al.,
2012b; Vytal et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 2013a,b). In fact, and
consistent with some models (Spence and Spence, 1966), threat
of shock facilitates habitual responses (Cornwell et al., 2012b).
Threat of shock-mediated performance improvement during
Stroop tasks may be due to a narrowing of attention that restricts
attention to peripheral distracting cues (Easterbrook, 1959). This
possibility is supported by a number of studies using stressors
other than shock such as ego threat, time pressure, or loud noises,
which have been shown to reduce stress interference on conflict
and Stroop tasks (O’Malley and Poplawsky, 1971; O’Malley and
Gallas, 1977; Chajut and Algom, 2003; Booth and Sharma, 2009).
This may be due to a general increased in non-specific arousal.
Indeed, drugs that increased physiological arousal also reduce
Stroop interference (Callaway, 1959; Kenemans et al., 1999).
Further evidence that threat of shock can facilitate attention
to specific stimuli comes from a recent study of sustained atten-
tion (Robinson et al., 2013a). Vigilance or sustained attention is
the ability to maintain attention and alertness during prolonged
and monotonous tasks. The maintenance of attention is highly
dependent on attentional control; failure of attentional control
leads to attentional lapses and off-task thinking (Mcvay and Kane,
2010). Robinson et al. examined the impact of threat of shock in
a task in which subjects responded to highly frequent “go” stimuli
but withheld responses to very infrequent neutral “nogo” targets.
Threat of shock significantly reduced errors of commission (i.e.,
accidentally pressing during nogo targets) while having no effect
on go trials or overall reaction time. This indicates that threat of
shock serves to improve response inhibition by focusing attention
on the infrequent nogo targets.
If stress facilitates conflict processing, then why did threat of
shock impair performance during Choi et al.’s (2012) conflict-
response task and Pallak et al.’s (1975) Stroop task? One possibility
is that these tasks may not have been sufficiently difficult to fully
occupy attentional resources. When a task does not completely
occupy attentional resources, available resources can be allocated
to task-irrelevant distractors, interfering with the task at hand
(Bishop, 2009; Vytal et al., 2012, see also below). Choi et al.’s task
was clearly not as taxing as the Hu et al.’s task. Overall reaction
time in the former task was faster and accuracy in in congru-
ent trials was much higher than in the latter task (∼740ms/3.1%
errors and 960ms/14% errors, respectively in the safe condition).
Similarly, there was little time pressure in the Pallak et al.’s study.
Clearly, differences in processing loads may impact the effect of
anxiety on performance, a possibility that is further discussed in
the memory section below.
HOT COGNITION
Attentional bias
Cognitive models of anxiety have been influential in postulating
attentional bias operating at an early stage of information process-
ing. Specifically, attentional bias for threat may play a prominent
role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Mogg
and Bradley, 2005; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler and Koster,
2010; Macleod and Mathews, 2012). There is substantial evidence
showing that dispositionally and clinically anxious individuals
exhibit an attentional bias toward or away from threat (Mogg
and Bradley, 2005; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler and Koster, 2010;
Macleod and Mathews, 2012), a finding that tends to be repli-
cated by threat of shock. However, the nature, mechanisms, and
contexts of these biases remain to be clarified.
Initial studies indicated attentional bias toward threat in clin-
ical and dispositional anxiety (see Cisler and Koster, 2010).
However, more recent studies have demonstrated qualita-
tively different types of threat biases, including preferential
engagement, difficulty in disengagement, or attentional avoid-
ance (Cisler and Koster, 2010; Sheppes et al., 2013). There is
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now increased effort to characterize the underlying mechanisms
of these components of attentional biases as well as the informa-
tion processing stage at which they occur (Bar-Haim et al., 2007;
Sheppes et al., 2013). Understanding the nature of anxiety medi-
ated bias is crucial from a theoretical and a practical viewpoint.
Theoretically, it is important to understand the underlying atten-
tional mechanisms of these biases given their potential role as
vulnerability markers (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Practically, a better
understanding of these mechanisms may help improve bias mod-
ification techniques aimed at changing the selective bias to threat.
Such techniques show therapeutic promise as a novel treatment
for anxiety (Macleod and Mathews, 2012).
There is substantial evidence that biases are not inflexible, but
are, in fact, very plastic and strongly influenced by environmental
stressors (Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Wald et al., 2013). These results
suggest that state anxiety is a key variable in the modulation of
bias (Mathews and Sebastian, 1993; Helfinstein et al., 2008). Yet,
relative to the large literature on bias in clinical and dispositional
anxiety, little is known about how state anxiety impacts biases.
Threat of shock may be an ideal assay to investigate bias plasticity.
The two most common procedures employed to examine
attentional bias are the emotional Stroop and the dot-probe tests.
The emotional Stroop, which is a variation of the classic Stroop
(Stroop, 1935) interference task (see below), consists of threat-
related (e.g., death) and neutral (e.g., chair) words printed in
varying colors (e.g., death printed in red). The subjects’ task
is to name the color of the word while ignoring its semantic
content. Despite their high similarity, the nature of the inter-
ference in the classic Stroop and emotional Stroop are highly
different. The classic color-naming Stroop examines the conflict
produced by semantic incompatibility. The interference is not
caused by conflict in the emotional Stroop, but by attentional cap-
ture by the emotional stimulus (Algom, 2004; Buhle et al., 2010).
The emotional Stroop has been criticized because of difficulties
interpreting results in term of attentional engagement and dis-
engagement (Cisler and Koster, 2010). The dot-probe addresses
some of these limitations. In the dot-probe task, word pairs,
one threat-related, and one neutral are presented briefly on the
screen. Subjects are required to respond as quickly as possible
to a small visual stimulus that replaces one of the words fol-
lowing their removal. An attentional bias toward or away from
threat is revealed when subjects are faster or slower, respectively,
to respond to a probe that replaces a threat word relative to
neutral word. Three studies examined the influence of anxiety
evoked by threat of shock using the emotional Stroop in low and
high dispositional anxiety individuals (Miller and Patrick, 2000;
Edwards et al., 2006, 2010). Low dispositional anxious subjects
displayed no attentional bias, including when they were antic-
ipating shocks. Edwards et al. (2006, 2010) found that while
high dispositional anxious subjects had no attentional bias in the
control no shock condition, color-naming of threat words was
delayed during shock anticipation (Edwards et al., 2006, 2010).
In contrast, in another study, high dispositional anxious sub-
jects exhibited delayed color-naming responses to threat words in
the no shock control condition, an effect that was not affected
by threat of shock (Miller and Patrick, 2000). The discrepancy
among these studies may be explained by the different levels of
dispositional anxiety of the high dispositional anxious groups.
The mean dispositional anxiety score was 20% higher in the high
dispositional anxious subjects in Miller and Patrick’s study (54.4)
compared to the Edwards et al. (2006, 2010) studies (46 and
45, respectively). Miller and Patrick’s results are consistent with
the literature that has documented delayed color-naming threat
words in high dispositional anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), prob-
ably because high dispositional anxiety is also associated high
state anxiety (Macleod andMathews, 1988). Thus, threat of shock
may have failed to further increase the magnitude of the effect
because of a ceiling effect. These results are consistent with the
proposition that in non-clinically anxious individuals, attentional
bias is an interactive function of dispositional anxiety and state
anxiety due to a current stressor (Macleod and Mathews, 1988).
So far, a single study has examined the effect of threat of
shock on attentional bias using the dot-probe. Shechner et al.
(2012) showed that under threat of shock subjects took longer to
respond to a probe that followed a threat cue compared to a neu-
tral cue, indicating vigilance away from threat (Shechner et al.,
2012). These results are consistent with evidence from natural-
istic studies that have demonstrated attention away from threat
cues during combat stimulation (Wald et al., 2011) or exposure
to rocket attacks (Bar-Haim et al., 2010). The apparent contradic-
tion in the effect of threat of shock in the emotional Stroop and
the dot-probe may be due to the fact that these two tests probe
different aspects of bias. The emotional Stroop may engage late
control processes and the dot-probe early attentional processes
(Macleod et al., 1986; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The construct of the
bias within each task is also a matter of debate. It has been argued
that the emotional Stroop reflects an affective reaction (i.e., a per-
ceptual bias as outlined above) rather than an attentional process
(Algom, 2004). Similarly, it is unclear whether biases associated
with the dot-probe are related to disengagement difficulties or to
initial orienting (Salemink et al., 2009; Clarke et al., 2013). Note,
however, that it is also possible that the data from the emotional
Stroop and dot-probe tests are consistent. Interference by threat
cues in the emotional Stroop may reflect effortful avoidance of
processing threat cues rather than attentional capture by these
cues (De Ruiter and Brosschot, 1994). According to this view,
threat of shock would promote threat cue avoidance, a conclu-
sion that is consistent with a number of studies that have shown
that stress can lead to a shift of attention away from danger cues
(Mathews and Sebastian, 1993; Amir et al., 1996; Chen et al., 2002;
Garner et al., 2006; Helfinstein et al., 2008). It may therefore be
that, consistent with the emotion perception studies highlighted
above (Table 1) (Grillon and Charney, 2011; Robinson et al.,
2011, 2012a), anxiety biases the processing of threats, but the dif-
ferent tasks assess different adaptive responses (i.e., approach or
avoidance) to these threats.
Recently, Etkin et al. (2006, 2010) introduced a novel emo-
tion conflict Stroop-like procedure. The task requires subjects
to identify the expression of a face (fearful or happy) while
ignoring words “happy” or “fear” superimposed on the faces
(Etkin et al., 2006). This paradigm provides a measure of two
important aspects of interference, conflict detection and conflict
regulation. Emotional conflict detection is the classic detection of
incongruence, which results in delayed responses to incongruent
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trials. Conflict regulation or adaptation is the improvement of
these delayed responses to incongruent trials when they follow
incongruent trials, suggesting activation of emotional regulatory
mechanisms (Etkin et al., 2010). Investigations of these regula-
tory mechanisms are in their infancy but could provide useful in
understanding implicit emotional regulation (Etkin et al., 2010).
Generalized anxiety disorder and panic disorder are associated
with impaired conflict adaptation (Chechko et al., 2009; Etkin
et al., 2010; Etkin and Schatzberg, 2012). Individuals with vulner-
ability to anxiety disorders due to high trait anxiety or behavioral
inhibition do not show such impairment (Jarcho et al., 2013; Krug
and Carter, 2012). Similarly, in the only threat of shock study
conducted so far, conflict adaptation was unaffected by the antic-
ipation of shock (Robinson et al., 2011). These results suggest
that poor emotional conflict adaptation may be associated with
the disease process rather than being a vulnerability marker or an
outcome of state anxiety.
One leading explanation for the attentional bias in anxiety is
that threat-related stimuli have a special status, namely that they
are prioritized and have privileged access to the amygdala. In
other words, threat-related stimuli are processed automatically.
This view is supported by studies showing amygdala activation
to unattended (“unseen”) threat-related stimuli (Morris et al.,
1999; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). Accordingly, the amygdala plays
a prominent role in the pre-attentive and automatic detection of
threat cues. However, the automaticity of amygdala processing
of such cues has been questioned by several studies arguing that
amygdala activation by threat cues (e.g., fearful faces) requires
attentional resources (Pessoa, 2005). These studies have demon-
strated that amygdala reactivity to threat-related distractors can
be abolished in perceptually demanding contexts (Pessoa et al.,
2005), which is, in turn, consistent with the concept that distrac-
tors cannot be processed when perceptual capacity is exhausted
(Lavie et al., 2004). Thus, while the amygdala plays an impor-
tant role in threat detection it may do so in concert with other
structures (Cisler and Koster, 2010).
The threat of shock could be useful to investigate the bound-
aries between automatic and more controlled mechanisms medi-
ating bias. It is now clear that biases are flexible and are strongly
influenced by contextual stressors (Bar-Haim et al., 2010). One
possibility is that the automaticity of bias is influenced by the
nature of the stressor. While there are obvious advantages in
requiring control processes of mild threat distractors in an
innocuous environment, this may not be adaptive when danger
looms. Fast and automatic capture of potential threats may then
become crucial to survival. The possibility that automaticity of
threat detection depends on environmental threat was tested by
Cornwell et al. (2011). These authors examined the effect of threat
of shock on threat bias in a paradigm previously employed to
investigate amygdala activation to task-irrelevant fearful and neu-
tral faces under low and high perceptual load (Bishop et al., 2007).
The no-threat condition replicated the basic finding of greater
amygdala response to fearful compared to neutral faces under low
but not high perceptual load (Cornwell et al., 2011). However,
consistent with the hypothesis that anxiety sensitizes threat detec-
tion, amygdala activation to fearful faces under high perceptual
load was preserved during shock anticipation (Cornwell et al.,
2011). These results are therefore consistent with the hypothesis
that threat detection requires processing resources in innocuous
contexts but become automatic in threatening environments.
It is clear that induced-anxiety biases attention, either by
changing its selectivity or it sensitivity to threat, which likely has,
in turn, downstream effects on cognition that can be positive or
negative depending on the nature of the task at hand.
MEMORY
Memory encompasses processes involved in the encoding, stor-
age, and retrieval of information perceived and attended to
in the prior sections. While there is clear evolutionary advan-
tage to facilitating threat detection and rapid sensory respond-
ing in unpredictable environments, these changes observed in
both induced (Robinson et al., 2011, 2012a) and pathological
anxiety (Morgan III and Grillon, 1999; Ge et al., 2011) may
actually come at the expense of goal-directed cognitive pro-
cesses, which are central to both long- and short-term (working)
memory. Anxiety induced by unpredictable threat of shock has
a selective effect on memory that is dependent on modality
(spatial or verbal), difficulty, and task type (working mem-
ory or long-term memory). Here we therefore divide memory
into two broad categories; working (short-term) memory and
long-term memory. The main focus is on cold memory pro-
cesses, as we highlight a deficit of work examining the impact
of threat of shock on hot memory. Broadly speaking, the cur-
rent literature is mixed, but there is some agreement in find-
ings across different anxiety manipulations and anxiety profiles
(dispositional or clinical). In particular, the majority of find-
ings demonstrate that spatial working memory is disrupted by
anxiety disorders and long-term episodic memory (especially
for negative emotional stimuli) is enhanced. Threat of shock
induces decrements in short-term memory accuracy on par
with those seen in patients, whereas other induction methods
and dispositionally anxious subjects show only capacity deficits,
suggesting that threat of shock is a better model of anxious
pathology. In general, performance impairments are typically
associated with high state anxiety as opposed to high disposi-
tional anxiety (Hodges and Durham, 1972; Hockey et al., 1986),
suggesting that the experience of anxiety may be the primary




Working memory refers to a temporary storage system that can
be used to encode, rehearse, and manipulate information in mind
(Postle, 2006; Jonides et al., 2008). In contrast to long-termmem-
ory, working memory refers specifically to short-term storage of
information, and there is evidence from patients with cortical
lesions that suggests these two types of memory rely on partially
separable neural systems (Baddeley and Warrington, 1970; Vallar
and Shallice, 2007). One of the most commonly used working
memory tasks is the n-back paradigm (where subjects respond
to successive stimuli based on whether they match the stimulus 1,
2, or 3 trials back etc.), because cognitive load or task difficulty
can be parametrically modulated.
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Table 4 | Effects of anxiety on memory (arrows represent direction of effect).
Domain Task details Threat of shock Anxiety disorders
References References
Short-term memory Performance on verbal and spatial n-back
performance, Sternberg, and corsi blocks
test.
↓ Lavric et al., 2003; Kalisch et al., 2006;
Shackman et al., 2006; Vytal et al., 2012
↓ van der Wee et al., 2003;
Boldrini et al., 2005
Short-term memory Performance on digit span, OSPAN, or
reading span; reaction time on short-term
memory tasks
= Pyke and Agnew, 1963 = Boldrini et al., 2005
Long-term memory Performance on recall or recognition tests
of words
↑ White, 1932; Chiles, 1958; Singh et al.,
1979
↑* McNally et al., 1989;
Friedman et al., 2000;
Paunovic et al., 2002
* “hot” negatively-valenced or disorder-specific material.
Research in patients suggests that pathological anxiety may
specifically impair spatial short-term memory performance;
patients with different anxiety disorders show deficits in spatial
working memory, but not verbal working memory performance
or verbal working memory capacity (Kizilbash et al., 2002; van
der Wee et al., 2003; Boldrini et al., 2005). In contrast, dispo-
sitional anxiety is frequently associated with reduced working
memory capacity but not performance, as captured by digit span
measures or increased reaction time on verbal and spatial short-
term memory tasks (Darke, 1988; Macleod and Donnellan, 1993;
Ikeda et al., 1996; Derakshan and Eysenck, 1998; Richards et al.,
2000; Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001), however see Markham and Darke
(1991), Eysenck et al. (2005), Hansen et al. (2009). Together these
findings suggest that baseline anxiety may have in impact on
short-term memory processing efficiency but not accuracy.
Consistent with the patient research, studies examining the n-
back task indicate that threat of shock disrupts both verbal (Vytal
et al., 2012, 2013) and spatial short-term memory (Lavric et al.,
2003; Shackman et al., 2006) but the impairment is more robust
in spatial working memory (Lavric et al., 2003; Shackman et al.,
2006; Vytal et al., 2013) [see Kalisch et al. (2006) for evidence
indicating that threat of shock does not impair verbal 2-back per-
formance]. This may be because working memory impairment is
the result of competition for cognitive and sensory-perceptual
resources. In particular, induced-anxiety may have a more robust
impact on spatial working memory because the extensive neural
resources shared between anxiety and spatial working memory
are less susceptible to top-down attentional control than the
resources shared between anxiety and verbal working memory
processes. Conversely, the impact of anxiety on verbal working
memory is dependent upon cognitive load; low, but not high, cog-
nitive load verbal working memory tasks are impaired by threat
of shock (Lavric et al., 2003; Shackman et al., 2006; Vytal et al.,
2012, 2013). High-load verbal working memory tasks have been
shown to actually reduce anxiety, while low-load verbal working
memory tasks are disrupted by anxiety. Thus, there may be a more
complex interaction between verbal working memory and anx-
iety, which may depend upon top-down control, and leads to
less robust overall effects of threat of shock on verbal memory.
Together, these findings are consistent with theories that empha-
size the role of shared resources in accuracy impairment [e.g., the
two-component model (Vytal et al., 2012, 2013), and a model
based on hemispheric asymmetries (Shackman et al., 2006)].
The basic premise of such models is that anxiety garners neu-
ral resources critical to working memory, resulting in decreased
accuracy.
Working memory research has, however, demonstrated that
shock anticipation does not alter all working memory functions.
Working memory capacity tests (e.g., digit span) are unaffected
by anxiety induced by threat of shock (Pyke and Agnew, 1963),
suggesting that threat-related working memory impairments may
be specific to processes that require ongoing maintenance in the
face of interference (e.g., n-back tasks where rapid succession
of stimuli must be attended to, responded to, and subsequently
forgotten/ignored) as opposed to intrinsic resource limitations.
This is in contrast with research examining the effects of other
anxiety induction methods where working memory capacity is
limited by anxiety (Schoofs et al., 2008). Specifically, working
memory capacity, not performance accuracy (however see Oei
et al., 2006), is impaired by threatening pictures (Lindström and
Bohlin, 2012), the cold pressor test (Schoofs et al., 2008; Duncko
et al., 2009), and incidental changes in state anxiety (Walker and
Spence, 1964; Firetto and Davey, 1971; Lapointe et al., 2013).
In contrast to research using threat of shock, these findings are
in line with processing efficiency theory (Eysenck and Calvo,
1992), which argues that anxious worry (1) reduces working
memory processing capacity and (2) increases effort necessary
to perform the task, thus increasing reaction time [although
Duncko et al. (2009) found decreased reaction time under stress].
However, these findings are muddled by other studies that show
state anxiety is not related to a reduction in working memory
capacity [e.g., threatening movies: no effect on n-back (Fales
et al., 2008; Qin et al., 2009) test anxiety: no effect on auditory
verbal working memory, but impaired short-term item recall,
(Vedhara et al., 2000); cold pressor test: no effect on Sternberg
item recognition, (Porcelli et al., 2008)]; and their incongruence
with threat of shock working memory research. With effects lim-
ited to processing efficiency (i.e., reaction time) perhaps a more
robust, evocative, and translational method like threat of shock
is necessary to truly model working memory impairments asso-
ciated with anxiety. Further, many of these studies are subject to
methodological concerns (e.g., verification of sustained emotion
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induction, psychometric matching of tasks to determine speci-
ficity of effects), which limit the scope of the conclusions that can
be drawn from the existing body of research [see Shackman et al.
(2006) for methodological considerations in the study of emo-
tion × cognition interactions, and Vytal et al. (2012) for further
articulation of these concerns]. As such, these results should be
interpreted with appropriate limitations in mind.
Long-term memory
Some work has shown that in contrast with certain short-term
memory tasks, patients with anxiety disorders are not impaired
in long-term memory (Gladsjo et al., 1998; Kizilbash et al., 2002;
Boldrini et al., 2005). However, examining the literature as whole,
long-term memory findings in anxiety patients are mixed; anxi-
ety patients have been shown to exhibit impairment in long-term
episodic memory (Lucas et al., 1991; Asmundson et al., 1994;
Cohen et al., 1996; Airaksinen et al., 2005).
Unlike the impairment seen in working memory studies,
several studies suggest that long-term memory is facilitated
by threat of shock. There is ample research to suggest that
emotional arousal and the physiological responses that can
accompany it (e.g., increase in glucocorticoids, epinephrine, and
norepinephrine) facilitate encoding and memory consolidation
processes by the release of hormones in the brainstem and baso-
lateral amygdala (Ledoux, 1998; Cahill et al., 2003; Roozendaal
et al., 2009). Hippocampal connections with the amygdala are
thought to mediate this memory enhancement (Roozendaal,
2002; Roozendaal et al., 2006). In line with this: recognition
of paired word associates (Chiles, 1958; Singh et al., 1979) and
free recall of word lists (White, 1932) is greater when subjects
are at risk of shock [but see Weymar et al. (2013) for a null
finding]. From an evolutionary standpoint, it is fitting that threat-
ening environments may lead to better declarative memory of
such experiences, so that similar situations in the future can be
recognized as such and avoided.
However, the relationship between anxiety and memory is
anything but straightforward. It is important to note that a meta-
analytic review of studies examining the effects of stress and stress
hormones onmemory found the opposite effect—that declarative
long-termmemory is impaired by stress and that this impairment
is related to an increased cortisol response (Sauro et al., 2003). A
closer look at these studies reveals that timing is a key component
in determining the effects of anxiety on long-term memory. The
timing of the stressor (e.g., encoding, post-encoding, retrieval
etc.) can impact whether or not a memory trace is solidified or
disrupted (Roozendaal, 2002). Specifically, an anxiety-provoking
context during episodic memory formation is facilitative, but dur-
ing retrieval it is detrimental. These effects however can only be
isolated in long-term memory paradigms where encoding and
retrieval periods are separate. Future work should seek to dis-
sociate the effects of anxiety upon different stages of memory
formation and retrieval.
Regarding other anxiety inductions, and in contrast to work-
ingmemory, long-termmemory studies indicate that both encod-
ing and retrieval are disrupted by induced-anxiety. The cold
pressor test has been shown to impair long-term memory encod-
ing and retrieval of both verbal and spatial information (Kuhajda
et al., 1998; Ishizuka et al., 2007). However, there are studies to
suggest that these manipulations do not affect long-term mem-
ory (Wolf et al., 2001, 2002). Again, the inconsistencies observed
suggest that these methods, while sometimes effective, may not be
ideal for modeling anxiety-related memory impairments.
HOT COGNITION
Studies examining the impact of threat of shock on affective
memory tasks are lacking. Psychosocial stress has been shown to
impair retrieval of emotional words (Kuhlmann et al., 2005) and
event-related potential research has shown that dispositional anx-
iety leads to a decreased ability to filter out threatening distractors
in a working memory task (Stout et al., 2013), indicating that hot
cognitive processes which impact attention also impact working
memory storage efficiency. In long-term memory tasks, patients
with anxiety disorders generally show impairment unless the
memories are affectively negative, in which case long-termmemory
may be facilitated (Friedman et al., 2000; Paunovic et al., 2002).
Specifically, individuals with clinical anxiety (McNally et al., 1989;
Friedman et al., 2000; Paunovic et al., 2002) or high dispositional
anxiety (Mathews et al., 1989; Reidy and Richards, 1997) tend to
have better recall of threatening information [but see Mogg et al.
(1987) for an alternate view]. However, the recall bias observed
in dispositionally anxious participants is somewhat fragile [e.g.,
not replicable over experiments or experimental blocks (Norton
et al., 1988; Nugent and Mineka, 1994)]; suggesting that episodic
memory biases in dispositional anxiety may be transient and
surface only when there are strong relationships among disposi-
tion/pathology, mood, and stimuli. This is somewhat inconsistent
with the long-term memory facilitation for neutral stimuli under
threat of shock. One possible explanation is the emotional state
of subjects during encoding; in healthy subjects, when anxiety is
induced or emotionally-arousing stimuli encountered, episodic
memory encoding, and consolidation is enhanced, however in
clinical populations, this enhancement is tied to anxiety-relevant
stimuli. A large body of research demonstrates an attentional
and perceptual bias toward threatening information in anxious
individuals [except for PTSD where evidence for a threat bias is
mixed (Buckley et al., 2000)] see previous sections; Bar-Haim
et al. (2007). When anxiety is induced by threat of shock, all
information is contextually linked to the anxious state and hence
preferentially processed (maintained or encoded). By contrast, in
anxiety disorders only negative stimuli are anxiety-relevant and so
encoding may be restricted to these stimuli. In general, however,
the lack of threat of shock studies in this area makes conclusions
premature and future work is needed to dissociate the causes of
this discrepancy.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
Broadly speaking, we define “executive” functions as those which
require combining information processed by the mechanisms pre-
viously reviewed. Aspects of learning, perception, and attentional
control, both hot and cold, are all integrated to guide complex
future-oriented behaviors. In reviewing the literature on this final
cognitive domain, we focus on three types of executive function:
(1) decision-making behavior, (2) planning, and (3) spatial nav-
igation. Given the integrative nature of these functions we do
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not make a distinction between hot and cold processes. We show
threat of shock mimics, at least in part, the effects of anxiety
disorders on both planning (i.e., no effect) and decision-making
(i.e., promoting harm avoidant decisions), while at the same time
having the opposite effect upon spatial navigation (Table 6).
Decision-making
There is evidence that both translational threat of shock and
anxiety disorders promote harm avoidant, loss aversion, decision-
making. Decision-making behavior can become more cautious
and conservative under anxiety [see Starcke and Brand (2012) for
a review examine a broader range of “stress” manipulations]. On
the one hand, anxiety induced by threat of shock has been shown
to induce premature responding (before all options are presented)
in decisions where options are revealed sequentially (Keinan,
1987), but the opposite pattern (increased response time) is seen
when subjects are asked to make decisions on a trial to trial basis
(e.g., matching on card sorting tasks; Murphy, 1959). Moreover,
in gambling tasks where probabilities are known, threat of shock
can increase risk-avoidant decision-making and lead to more
conservative gambles (Clark et al., 2012). This latter effect is
consistent with loss aversion [alongside indifference to rewards
(Shankman et al., 2012)] which has been shown in pathological
anxiety disorders (Mueller et al., 2010). The same conservative
style is also seen following the cold pressor test (Mather et al.,
2009) [especially in female subjects (Lighthall et al., 2009, 2012)]
although it may depend upon whether decisions are being made
to increase gains or minimize losses. Specifically, the “reflection
effect”—the tendency of individuals to make risky decisions in
the loss domain but conservative decisions in the gain domain—
is increased by anxiety induced via the cold pressor test (Porcelli
and Delgado, 2009).
Dispositional anxiety and speech anxiety inductions, how-
ever, demonstrate the opposite effect. Reduced risk avoidance has
been shown following speech stressors (Starcke et al., 2008); but
this effect seems to be gender-dependent, with slightly improved
decision-making (i.e., increased gains on Iowa gamble task) seen
in anxious females and impaired decision-making restricted to
anxious males (Preston et al., 2007; van den Bos et al., 2009).
Similarly, high dispositional anxiety is associated with impaired
performance on the Iowa gambling task (Miu et al., 2008) [which
is also gender-dependent (de Visser et al., 2010)], and prob-
lem gamblers with high dispositional anxiety demonstrate more
severe pathological gambling problems (Ste-Marie et al., 2002)
[anxiety disorders can also be comorbid with problem gambling
(Petry et al., 2005)]. In general, firm conclusions are premature,
but there is evidence that both translational threat of shock and
anxiety disorders promote harm avoidant, loss averse, decision-
making while dispositional anxiety and speech anxiety inductions
promote the opposite pattern.
Spatial navigation
Spatial navigation in anxiety has been assessed via virtual reality
maze tasks as well as simple pen and paper “trail-making” tasks.
Note that, as a caveat, although we define this as an executive
function which requires integration of multiple facets of cogni-
tion, there is an extensive literature in rodents which links aspects
of spatial navigation to reflexive responding in the hippocam-
pus (Ekstrom et al., 2003). Threat of shock in healthy individuals
has been shown to enhance spatial navigation (Cornwell et al.,
2012a), as has the cold pressor anxiety manipulation (Duncko
et al., 2007) [with null effect of speech stressors (Starcke et al.,
2008)]. In anxiety disorders, however, the opposite effect is seen;
spatial navigation is impaired (Cohen et al., 1996; Mueller et al.,
2009). This discrepancy could possibly be driven by the context
of the anxiety. Anxiety may prioritize fast and easy navigation
away from threats, but impair navigation which is unrelated to
threats. In healthy individuals undergoing anxiety induction, the
anxiety and task are contextually linked, whereas in a person
with an anxiety disorder, the task is unrelated to their anxiety.
As such, task-driven anxiety may improve performance while
task-unrelated anxiety impairs performance. Another possibility
is that there is a key difference between the “adaptive” anxious
state triggered by acute anxiety inductions and the pathological,
more trait-related anxiety in anxiety disorders (discussed in more
detail in the Discussion section below). Acute state anxiety may
improve navigation; chronic trait anxiety may impair navigation.
Regardless, translational anxiety inductions and anxiety disorders
seem to have opposite effects upon spatial navigation.
Planning
Finally, planning ability can be assessed by the Tower of London
task (and its variants; e.g., the Tower of Hanoi or the Stockings of
Cambridge) in which subjects have to work out how many moves
are required to make two patterns look identical. Threat of shock
has no effect upon the one touch tower of London (Table 5; pre-
viously unpublished data using this task, see Appendix for trial
example). This is, in fact, consistent with the effects of pathologi-
cal anxiety disorders, which also leave planning ability intact (van
Tol et al., 2011) [in contrast with depression (Elliott et al., 1997)
and sad mood induction (Robinson and Sahakian, 2009) which
both impair planning on this task]. This null finding (and dis-
sociation from sad/depressed mood) provides important context,
because it demonstrates that threat of shock does not have broad
indiscriminate effects on executive function; it can increase risk
avoidance and improve spatial navigation while leaving planning
performance intact.
DISCUSSION
While the threat of shock paradigm has been used extensively to
examine emotional responses and defensive mechanisms (Davis
et al., 2010), it is also emerging as a powerful tool to study the
effects of anxiety on cognition. Below, we summarize the findings
of this review before addressing questions for future research.
THE IMPACT OF THREAT OF SHOCK ON COGNITION
Threat of shock facilitates early sensory-perceptual processing
of neutral stimuli, improves the detection of negative informa-
tion, impairs performance on tasks with emotional distractors,
and facilitates resolution of conflict. In addition, threat of shock
impairs short-term memory but facilitates long-term memory as
well as certain aspects of decision-making and executive function.
In general, the changes can be seen as part of an overall adaptive
mechanism of harm avoidance in which threatening stimuli are
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Table 5 | Impact of threat of shock on accuracy (Acc) and planning time (RT; ms) on the one touch tower of London task.
Safe Threat
2 move 3 move 4 move 5 move 2 move 3 move 4 move 5 move
Mean Acc 0.72 0.66 0.49 0.28 0.73 0.70 0.55 0.32
s.e.m. 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04
Mean RT 4784 5762 6231 7214 4696 5447 6344 6892
s.e.m. 231 250 207 224 253 230 247 291
Twenty two healthy subjects (per structured clinical interview completed by a physician; e.g., Robinson et al., 2013a) underwent a shock work-up procedure (e.g.,
Robinson et al., 2011) and then completed the task under alternating threat and safe conditions (order counterbalanced). The task was adapted from previously
published studies (e.g., Elliott et al., 1997; Murphy et al., 1999, 2002) and involved intermixed 2, 3, 4, and 5 move problems (see Figure A1 for an example). Subjects
completed a short 5 trial practice session before commencing the task. There were a total of 6 different problems within each difficulty level. During each trial
subjects were provided with 4 options for the number of moves required. Response reaction time and accuracy data were analyzed in 2 × 4 threat (safe, threat) ×
load (2, 3, 4, 5 move) ANOVAs. Across safe and threat conditions, task performance deteriorates as load increases [RT = F(3, 19) = 42, p < 0.001; Acc = F(3,19) = 17,
p < 0.001] but this does not interact with anxiety induced by threat of shock [RT = F(3,19) = 0.7, p = 0.6; Acc = F(3,19) = 0.2, p = 0.9].
Table 6 | Effects of anxiety on executive functions (arrows represent direction of effect).
Domain Task details Threat of shock Anxiety disorders
References References
Decision-making Risk avoidance on gamble tasks ↑ Clark et al., 2012 ↑ Mueller et al., 2010
Spatial navigation VR maze navigation performance ↑ Cornwell et al., 2012a ↓ Cohen et al., 1996; Mueller et al., 2009
Planning Calculate moves on tower of London = Table 5 = Elliott et al., 1997; van Tol et al., 2011
privileged at all levels of cognitive function, but at a potential cost
for some functions (e.g., short-term memory).
Thus, anxiety boosts sensory-perceptual processing, which
subsequently influences downstream stages of information pro-
cessing. These effects may be facilitative or detrimental depending
on task demands. Consistent with the dual-model process the-
ory (Pessoa, 2009) and attentional control theory (Eysenck et al.,
2007), threat of shock affects the balance between stimulus-
driven and goal-directed behaviors (Shackman et al., 2011a;
Cornwell et al., 2012b), such that performance is improved when
emotional information is task-relevant but impaired when it is
task-irrelevant.
It is generally assumed that anxiety induces an impairment in
inhibitory control, (Derryberry and Reed, 2002; Eysenck et al.,
2007), which comprises the ability to inhibit prepotent responses
and to resist interference from distractors (Friedman andMiyake,
2004). These two types of inhibitory control have been tradition-
ally tested with the classic Stroop, a test of inhibition of prepotent
responses, and the emotional Stroop, a test of interference by
an emotional distractor. Threat of shock does not have a uni-
formly detrimental effect on these two tests. In fact, threat of
shock impairs performance on the emotional Stroop, but, incon-
sistent with theoretical assumption, it improves performance on
the classic Stroop as well as on a measure of response inhibi-
tion (Robinson et al., 2013a). There is no simple explanation for
these divergent effects, which may have multiple causes, includ-
ing non-specific effects [e.g., tasks not psychometrically matched
(Thomaes et al., 2012)]. A critical distinction between these two
tests, however, is that one is a measure of conflict and the other is
not. Specifically, the classic Stroop is a true test of conflict between
two responses (or inhibitory control), whereas the emotional
Stroop is perhaps better characterized a measure of attentional
bias (Buhle et al., 2010; Etkin et al., 2011). This suggests that the
threat of shock facilitates inhibitory control, a result consistent
with findings using sustained attention tasks (Robinson et al.,
2013a), while at the same time increasing perceptual processing
of affectively negative information. These results could, neverthe-
less, also be explained by other mechanisms. For example, anxiety
could have opposite effect on regions of the anterior cingulate or
prefrontal cortex that are differently affected by affective and non-
affective incongruency (Haas et al., 2006). Anxiety also improves
the selectivity of attention (Easterbrook, 1959), which could facil-
itate a narrowing of attention to the target during the classic
Stroop. The emotional Stroop would not benefit from this selec-
tivity because emotional distractors may be processed implicitly
by the amygdala.
The differential effect of threat of shock on short-term vs.
long-term memory is also of note and might be attributed to
(1) to the overlap in neural resources between anxiety and short-
term memory and (2) the protracted role that stress hormones
play in consolidation. Short-term memory (Cohen et al., 1997)
and anxiety (Etkin, 2010) both engage prefrontal mechanisms,
and competition for this neural circuitry may result in temporary
impairment due to disruptedmaintenance of information. In con-
trast, episodic information encoding may be facilitated by threat
of shock with the release of stress hormones in the amygdala
and brainstem that serve to modulate long-term storage via the
hippocampus (Cahill and McGaugh, 1998).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 203 | 12
Robinson et al. The impact of anxiety on cognition
The impact of threat of shock on more complex executive
processes such as decision-making processes can also be seen
as consistent with a model of anxiety promoting cautious harm
avoidance including risk-avoidant decision-making (Clark et al.,
2012) and improved spatial navigation (Cornwell et al., 2012a).
However, this domain of cognition is also notable for the relative
paucity of studies and so considerable further work is needed to
specify the precise effects.
DIFFERENCES ACROSS THREAT OF SHOCK AND ANXIETY
DISORDERS
Threat of shock may thus accurately model the impact of anx-
iety disorders on hot cognition. One critical observation is that
anxiety disorders and threat of shock have discrepant effects on
(1) PPI, (2) classic Stroop, (3) conflict adaptation, (4) short-term
memory capacity, and (5) spatial navigation. These unique effects
in anxiety disorders are largely in cold cognitive functions which
require some form of cognitive control, and are consistent with
models (e.g., Bishop, 2007) postulating that anxiety disorders
are associated with poor attention control. The disorder-specific
effects may reflect long-term changes in response to prolonged
stress or dispositional anxiety. Specifically, there may be a true
dysfunctional vulnerability linked to cold function (impaired
attention control; Litz et al., 1996; Lagarde et al., 2010) which
either (1) predisposes vulnerable people to experience sustained
affective biases which lead to a vicious cycle toward anxiety dis-
orders; or (2) makes people anxious, which then lead to affective
biases. By contrast, hot cognitive functions, including those that
require cognitive control seem to be consistent across threat of
shock and anxiety disorders (although it should be noted that
this may vary across different anxiety disorder diagnoses). A fur-
ther possibility is that threat of shock accurately induces state
effects of anxiety, but sufferers are not always in a state of elevated
anxiety and so the discrepancies across threat of shock and anxi-
ety disorders reveal a distinction between state and trait effects.
One final possibility is that discrepancies are due to the tradi-
tional inverted-U relationship between anxiety and performance.
However, this seems unlikely. Many subjects experience very high
levels of anxiety during threat of shock, probably higher levels rel-
ative to anxious patients tested in the laboratory (without threat
of shock). In fact, one of the advantages of the threat of shock
is that we can compare performance across a number of tasks
keeping the level of anxiety constant. Clarifying the causes of
these divergent effects is a key question for future research (see
below).
NEURAL MECHANISMS
A comprehensive understanding of the neural mechanisms
underlying these effects is beyond the scope of this review.
However, it is worth highlighting some recent advances pointing
toward circuitry which may be involved. Both anxiety disorders
and threat of shock are strongly implicated in activity in the (a)
amygdala and (b) dorsal medial prefrontal cortex/dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (Shin et al., 2005; Etkin and Wager, 2007; Shin
and Liberzon, 2009; Hartley and Phelps, 2012; Linnman et al.,
2012; Maier et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 2012a). In fact, a cir-
cuit between these two regions is thought to drive a bias toward
aversive information (Robinson et al., 2012a). This is consistent
with the idea that the dorsal prefrontal (encompassing cingu-
late and dorsomedial) cortex is involved a emotional processing
(Etkin et al., 2011), especially appraisal (Maier et al., 2012) nega-
tive affect and cognitive control (Shackman et al., 2011b). As such,
it is possible that anxiety engages this circuit which then underlies
some improvements in cognitive functions (both hot and cold)
which promote the avoidance of danger. If turned on excessively,
however, this circuit may lead to the pathological biases in anxiety
disorders.
By contrast, functions which are down-regulated in anxiety
share some of this neural real estate. Working memory and
neutral cognitive control are both adversely affected by anxi-
ety and are thought to be processed within regions overlapping
this circuit (Pessoa et al., 2002; Shackman et al., 2011b). One
possibility, therefore is that resource “overload” occurs when neu-
ral real estate critical for the aforementioned harm avoidance
processes overlaps with circuitry involved in anxiety-unrelated
processes. The preferential processing of threat avoidant stimuli
may thus come at the expense of threat-unrelated processes (e.g.
working memory). Cognitive functions, like planning, which are
unperturbed by either threat of shock or anxiety disorders may,
moreover, rely on entirely separate circuitry (Shackman et al.,
2006). Of course this is likely an oversimplification, and it is worth
noting that a large number of regions are implicated in anxiety,
including some brain stem areas highlighted above. Going for-
ward, the threat of shock paradigmmay prove a promising tool to
clarify some of these neural mechanisms.
FUTURE QUESTIONS
Taken together, the above findings highlight a number of broad
questions that might be tackled in future research:
WHAT CAUSES THE SHIFT FROM ADAPTIVE TO MALADAPTIVE
ANXIETY?
As indicated above, there were a number of discrepant effects
across threat of shock and anxiety disorders, largely on cold cog-
nitive functions. An important question, therefore, is what drives
the difference between the effect of induced-anxiety and anxi-
ety disorders on cold cognitive functions? One possibility is that
this discrepancy reveals the differences between adaptive andmal-
adaptive anxiety. Specifically, in a threat of shock experiment, the
state of anxiety is entirely rational and an adaptive response to an
imminent threat. Anxiety disorders are, however, characterized
by anxiety at inappropriate times or to mildly aversive stimuli;
so called maladaptive anxiety. It will be important to identify
the mechanism(s) by which adaptive responding becomes mal-
adaptive. One possibility is that the same processes underlie both
effects, but in the case of maladaptive anxiety, the circuitry gets
“stuck” in the anxious state. This causes a broader array of stim-
uli to constitute threats (stimulus generalization) and impairs the
ability to down regulate threats (Lissek et al., 2009; Shackman
et al., 2009). What causes this switch to occur? Is there a ratchet-
ing effect whereby once the system is pushed too far it is unable to
restore healthy function? And once this occurs is that what leads
to the “cold” control impairments which appear to be restricted
to anxiety disorders? Clarifying the causes of these differences may
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reveal important mechanisms of relevance to the development of
anxiety disorders.
CANWE USE THIS UNDERSTANDING TO IMPROVE DIAGNOSIS AND
TREATMENT EFFICACY IN ANXIETY?
Clarifying the impact of anxiety on cognition may allow us to
more accurately assess the efficacy of treatments (Harmer et al.,
2011). For instance, a potential use of threat of shock in healthy
volunteers is as an analog model to identify the underlying
mechanisms of these affective components in anxiety disorders.
Assuming that the same mechanisms that are responsible for the
effect of anxiety evoked by threat of shock on hot functions are
also implicated in anxiety disorders, we can use the impacts of
threat of shock on cognition in healthy individuals to screen can-
didate anxiolytic compounds. A serious impediment to bringing
candidate anxiolytics to the marketplace is the lack of effective
models to screen drugs (Rodgers, 1997; Kola and Landis, 2004;
Dawson and Goodwin, 2005). This is because compounds that
have anti-anxiety profile in animal models subsequently lack clin-
ical efficacy in patients. Thus, developing a model for evaluating
efficacy in humans could facilitate the screening process and
bridge the gap between basic drug development and the psy-
chopharmacological treatment of patient. Threat of shock, which
appears to be a closer analog to pathological anxiety than some
other anxiety inductions based upon the evidence reviewed above
(e.g., Starcke et al., 2008 vs. Clark et al., 2012), could be such a
model.
CANWE USE COGNITIVE INTERVENTIONS TO TREAT ANXIETY?
On the other hand, clarifying the impact of performing cog-
nitive tasks on anxiety, may allow us to better understand and
refine cognitive treatments for anxiety. In particular, at least one
threat of shock study reviewed above showed that high cog-
nitive load serves to distract away from the state of anxiety
(Vytal et al., 2012). Specifically, performance of a “cold” ver-
bal n-back task reduced psychophysiological concomitants of
anxiety but only under the highest (3-back) load conditions.
Future work might explore whether this observation has ther-
apeutic value. In addition, recent advances have begun to use
“hot” cognitive training tasks to shift the negative biases in
anxiety. In such “cognitive training” tasks, a subject’s attention
is implicitly shifted toward positive (at the expense of nega-
tive) emotional cues, which over time leads to reduced negative
biases when assessed on cognitive tasks (Browning et al., 2010,
2012; Hakamata et al., 2010; Macleod and Mathews, 2012). This
technique may eventually be used to reduce the debilitating
negative biases, thus reducing anxious mood in anxiety disor-
ders. Either way, it may be possible to adopt both hot and
cold cognitive interventions to reduce the symptoms of anxiety
disorders.
FUTURE CHALLENGES
A key advantage of threat of shock is that it provides a well-
controlled manipulation of state anxiety in a within-subject
design. It may help address many fundamental questions con-
cerning the components and underlying mechanisms control,
bias and regulation mechanisms at different processing stages,
the role of context, and factors that contribute to inter-individual
differences in bias. However, there is no single standardized
“threat of shock” paradigm across the majority the reviewed
studies and a clearer picture may be achievable if more vari-
ables (e.g., block-length, shock frequency) were held consistent
across studies and key methodological considerations were taken
into account [see, for instance the “4 methodological desider-
ata” in Shackman et al. (2006)]. Similarly, many investigators
use the word “anxiety” without being specific about what they
are talking about. Anxiety can refer to anxiety disorders, dispo-
sitional anxiety, or state anxiety (experimentally-induced anxi-
ety); we recommend that investigators be more specific going
forward.
A number of further caveats are also worth considering. First,
given the number of cognitive processes there are very few stud-
ies utilizing threat of shock, leaving a large number of gaps in
the literature to get a good picture of the effect of induced-
anxiety on cognition. In addition, many tasks have yet to be
comprehensively tested across anxiety disorders and threat of
shock. Second, some threat of shock effects could reflect non-
specific increased in arousal rather than specific effects due to
negative affective states. However, many of the effects were selec-
tive, promoting the processing of threat- or potential threat-
relevant stimuli as opposed to neutral stimuli (Mogg and Bradley,
2005; Bar-Haim et al., 2007) or stimulus-relevant as opposed to
stimulus-irrelevant stimuli (Eason et al., 1969). Third, it is possi-
ble that subjects who participate in a threat of shock experiment
are representative of a uniquely harm avoidant population; high
dispositional anxiety subjects or subjects afraid of shock may not
be inclined to participate in such experiments [although it should
be noted that some researchers have used high dispositional anx-
iety subjects under threat of shock (Miller and Patrick, 2000;
Edwards et al., 2006, 2010)]. Finally, although very few shocks are
administered in threat of shock studies, it is possible that some
of the effects observed were due to sensitization mechanisms
(Richardson, 2000).
Future work should aim to rule-out and control for some of
these potential confounds. As a general prescription going for-
ward, we recommend that future studies should primarily (1)
further investigate basic “cold” control mechanisms to lay a strong
foundation for the study of “hot” cognition, (2) adopt recently
developed procedures to isolate the various components of threat-
induced bias, such as visual search, spatial cuing, eye tracking,
and classical conditioning (Cisler and Koster, 2010; Sheppes et al.,
2013; see also Clarke et al., 2013), (3) examine the interactions
between (shock-induced) state anxiety, temperamental disposi-
tion (e.g., trait anxiety) and experiential factors (e.g., adverse
life-events), (4) explore contextual-mediated shift in bias (Bar-
Haim et al., 2010), e.g., caused by changes in shock predictability
or shock temporal proximity, and (5) extend research on threat
of shock to individuals with clinical anxiety. Indeed, one pos-
sibility is that specific cognitive deficits in anxious individuals
may be latent and emerge only in stressful situations. Relatedly,
one may ask to which extend attentional control deficits and bias
are related to specific anxiety disorders or to proposed nosolog-
ical distinction (i.e., fear disorders vs. distress/misery disorders;
Vaidyanathan et al., 2012).
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In sum, we have presented an overview of the impacts of anx-
iety on cognition. Both threat of shock—a translational anxi-
ety induction—and pathological anxiety disorders promote the
detection of potentially harmful stimuli at multiple levels of cog-
nition from perception to attention to memory and executive
function. At the most basic level this tends to be associated
with improved perception of environmental changes irrespec-
tive of valence, but at more complex levels of cognition, leads
to promotion of cognitive processes relevant to harm avoidance
at a cost to certain functions such as working memory, while
leaving still further processes (such as planning) unperturbed.
However, we also draw attention to a number of processes, such
as spatial learning, PPI and non-emotional Stroop which are dis-
crepant across threat of shock and anxiety disorders. We argue
that this discrepancy, largely in cold cognitive functions, may
reveal the differences between adaptive and maladaptive anxi-
ety. Future work should attempt to delineate the causes of these
differences, as well as explore the possible use of (1) cognitive
interventions for the treatment of anxiety and (2) the use of
threat of shock as an analog screen for candidate anxiolytics.
The precise neural mechanisms underlying these effects are far
from clear; this review, which is the first to collate the grow-
ing number of studies using the translational threat of shock
paradigm, aims to highlight the value of this paradigm as a
means to clarify these neural mechanisms. Given the large bur-
den represented by anxiety disorders, such research is of pressing
concern.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE A1 | An example stimulus from the adapted version of the
tower of London—this stimulus represents a 5 move problem.
Problems are presented under both safe and threat conditions.
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